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Abstract 
Previous experiments have demonstrated but not explained people's 
tendency to exaggerate the probability of conjunctive events. The 
present study explores this tendency in several different contexts 
designed to reveal how the overestimation process works; the events 
which served as stimuli were either repetitive or unique with or 
without causal links between them. The design was either a within-subject 
or a between-subject design. The response mode was either percentages 
or chances. The results suggest that people use different strategies 
to assess conjunctions in different situations, all of which lead to 
overestimation. These processes are discussed and some suggestions 
are made about ways to overcome their negative effects. 
The Subjective Probability of Conjunctions 
People's tendency to overestimate the probability of conjunCtive 
events has been demonstrated in a number of studies. Bar-Hillel (1973), 
Cohen and Hansel (1978), and Slovic (1969) have used common gambling 
situations and choice between gambles as a response mode. As such, these 
experiments were quite restrictive in their possible applications and 
indirect in the way overestimation was inferred. Furthermore, none of 
the above experiments tried to explain the overestimation they found. 
Goldsmith (1978) and Wyer (1970; 1976; also Wyer, & Goldberg, 1970) 
used a more natural and direct manipulation. Both had subjects assess 
the probability of conjunctive events with Wyer using a general social 
context (e.g., "What is the probability that Governor Smith will be 
reelected and that state aid to education will be increased?") and 
Goldsmith using a judicial context (e.g., "What is the probability that 
the lighter belonged to the accused who also left it in the car?"). 
After testing a variety of models, Wyer (1976) found that subject's 
overestimated responses were best fitted by a combination of multiplying 
and averaging: 
P(MB) = l [P(A) 
2 
+ P(B) + P(A)P(B)] 
2 
Although such an algebraic model may predict subjects' assessments, it 
gives little psychological insight into how people perceive conjunctive 
events or why they overestimate their probability. 
Goldsmith (1978) concluded that subjects use different strategies 
for assessing a conjunction, depending on the components• order of 
magnitude, i.e., how large or small are the assessed P(A) and P(B/A). 
They are: (a) an averaging strategy (using the average of the two 
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components as a cue) when the two components' probabilities are between 
.3 and .7, (b) a smaller probability strategy (using as cue whichever of 
the two components is smaller) when the larger of the components' 
probabilities exceeds .7, and (c) the larger probability strategy 
(using as cue whichever is larger) when the larger of the components' 
probabilities lies below .7 and the smaller lies below .3. As subjects 
assessed the conjunctive event after assessing its components, the 
compound character of the event was emphasized and subjects were actually 
compelled to use a recomposition strategy; that is, assessing the 
compound event by way of aggregating the assessed components' probabilities. 
This, however, may not have been their only available strategy. Whether 
a conjunctive event is perceived as a compound or a simple event may 
depend on the experimental manipulation (e.g., does assessment of the 
component events preceed the evaluation of the compound), and in itself 
may affect the assessment strategy. 
How the event is perceived may affect the choice of assessment 
strategy in another respect. Kahneman and Tversky (1972, 1973) and Tversky 
and Kahneman (1980) have claimed that when people perceive an event as 
unique, they do not rely on relative frequency considerations when judging 
its probability, but adopt a number of heuristics. Thus, whether an 
event is perceived as unique or repetitive may affect the judgmental 
process; this is a second variable assumed to affect the judgment of 
conjunctive events. 
The f:illowing experiments explore probability assessment for 
conjunctive events in several contexts and under different experimental 
manipulations designed to highlight the working of the overestimation 
process. Experiment 1-4 deal with events for which it is meaningful 
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to interpret probability as relative freqyency ('repetitive event'). 
In Experiments 1 and 2 a between-subject design was adopted; one group 
of subjects assessed the probability of conjunctive events while 
different groups assessed the components' probabilities. In these two 
experiments, the subjects' response mode was also manipulated, In a 
within-subject design (Experiments 3 and 4), subjects were asked to 
assess the probability of the conjunctive event as well as its components' 
probabilities. 
Experiments 5 and 6 deal with highly unique events. In Experiment 5, 
subjects were asked about the probability that a given individual would 
perform two related or unrelated acts. In Experiment 6, subjects were 
asked about the probability Of two events, A and B. The pairs of events 
chosen for this experiment were such that A was perceived as causing 
Band B was perceived as preventing A. 
EXPERIMENT 1 AND 2: A BETWEEN-SUBJECT DESIGN 
The first two experime'nts were designed to test whether subjects 
overestimate the probability of conjunctive events even when they 
don't assess the components' probabilities in advance. The stimuli 
were repetitive events in which it was natural to interpret probabilities 
as relative frequency. Here one can either ask subjects about the 
probability of an event or about its relative frequency of occurrence 
thus manipulating the response mode. In Experiment 1, subjects were 
asked to assess probabilities. In Experiment 2, different subjects were 
asked to assess relative frequency. Otherwise the design of the 
experiments was identical, To avoid complexity, the experiments will 
be described sequentially except for the discussion which will be 
combined and presented following the results of Experiment 2. 
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Experiment 1: Probability as Relative Frequency 
Method 
Stimuli, The following sample space was chosen: All male Israeli 
citizens above 18 years of age. From this sample space, fourteen pairs 
of events were selected, each event consisting of randomly sampling an 
individual with a specific characteristic. In half of the pairs, the two 
characteristics were independent of each other and in the second half, 
there was a small causal dependency between them. An example of an 
independent pair: 
A - Men who weigh less than 95 kg. 
B - Men who have at least a high school education 
An example of a dependent pair: 
A - Men who are married 
B Men who have life insurance 
Pairs were constructed to 'vary in the relative frequency of subgroups 
A and Band in the strength and direction of dependency between the 
events (A and B) in the dependent pairs. 
Design and procedure. For each pair of events the percentages of 
A, B, A given B, B given A, (A&B) and (B&A) in the given sample were 
assessed. Each of these percentages was assessed for all events by a 
separate group of subjects. Each group received a questionnaire with 
one page of instructions. The first paragraph was the same for all 
questionnaires, "A certain governmental office collected information 
aboUt all male Israeli citizens above 18 years of age." Subjects were 
then told what particular percentage they were to estimate and given 
one example. Finally, subjects were told, "We don't expect you to know 
the exact answer to the above questions and many similar ones. We are 
only interested in your estimates concerning the percentage. Please 
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answer in percentages; give any number between O (in the above 
.population there is no one with this characteristic) and 100 (all the 
above population have this characteristic). 11 
The instructions to the specific tasks were as follows: 
Group {A,B): The middle paragraph read: "In the following 
questionnaire, there are a number of questions in which you are asked 
to assess the percentage of men from the defined population possessing 
a certain characteristic. For example: 'Of all male Israeli citizens 
above 18 years of age, what percentage are teachers?"' Following this 
instruction, subjects received 4 pages of questions, with 7 queStions 
on each page, The order of questions was randomized and the 4 pages 
were given in a different order to different subjects. 
Groups (A~B) and (BnA}: The middle paragraph for these groups 
read: "In the following questionnaire, there are a number of questions 
in which you are asked to assess the percentage of men from the defined 
population possessing certain characteristics. For example, 'Of all 
male Israeli citizens above 18 years of age, what percentage are both 
teachers and divorced?'" Two pages of seven questions each followed 
the instruction page. The order of questions was randomized and the 
order of the two pages was reversed for half the subjects, 
The only difference between the two groups was the order of events 
within each pair. For example, in one group, the question was "What 
percentage are -teachers and are divorced," and in the second group, 
the question was "What percentage are divorced and are teachers?". 
Groups (A/B) and (B/A): The middle paragraph for these groups 
read: "In the following questionnaire there are a number of questions 
in which you are asked to think about a sub-group of the above defined 
population, and assess the percentage of men from this sub-group possessing 
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a certain characteristic, For example: 'Of all divorced men, what 
percentage are teachers?' 11 The only difference between the two groups 
was in the order of events within each pair. The method of ordering 
and presenting the different questions was the same as for the previous 
two groups. 
Subjects. One hundred fifty-seven soldiers (candidates for an 
officer's training course) took part in the experiment. The different 
questionnaires were distributed randomly among the subjects: N(A,B)=32, 
N(A~B)•32, N(B~A)•30, N(A/B)•32, N(B/A)•31. 
Results 
For each question in each group, median estimates were computed, 
As no significant differences were found between the (AnB), estimate and 
the (BnA) estimate in 13 out of 14 questions, the data from groups (AflB) 
and (Bnc) were combined (see Table 1). 1 They are referred to as (A/IB). 
-------------------------
Insert Table 1 about here 
-----------------------~ 
Normatively, P(AAB) • P(A/B)P(B) = P(B/A)P(A). However, in all 14 
cases the median percentages of (AnB) were greater than the product of 
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the median estimates for (A/B) and (B); in 12 of 14 cases they were 
greater than the product of the medians for (B/A) and (A), and in 13 of 
the 14 cases they were greater than the average of both products as 
shown in column 6 of Table 1. 
A more modest normative requirement is that the conjunction be the 
smallest of all 5 estimates [P(A), P(B), P(A/B), P(B/A), P(A~B)J. 
Examination of Table 1 reveals that this typically is the case. The 
last row presents mean ranks of the 5 estimates over the 14 rows. 
No differences between responses to the dependent and independent 
events were detected. 
Experiment 2: Probability Defined as Chance 
Method 
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The only difference between Experiment 1 and 2 was that subjects 
were asked about the chances of events happening and not about their 
relative frequency. The first paragraph of the instruction page read: 
In a certain governmental office, there is a computer 
which stores a list of all male Israeli citizens above 18 
years of age. One of the employees in the office is interested 
in getting a name of a person who is randomly selected by the 
computer out of its sorted list. In the following questionnaire, 
you will find a number of questions in which you are asked to 
assess the chance that the computer will randomly choose a person 
with a defined characteristic. 
After this paragraph, a different example was given to each group. 
Group (A,B). "What is the chance that the man chosen 
randomly by the computer is a teacher?" 
Groups (AnB) and (BflA). "What is the chance that the man 
chosen randomly by the computer is a teacher and is divorced?" 
Groups (A/B) and (B/ A). "Assume that the man whom the 
computer randomly chose is a teacher. What is the chance that the 
same man is also divorced?" 
Finally, all subjects were told: "We are interested in your 
estimation concerning the chances. Give any number between O (no chance) 
and 100 (for sure)." 
Subjects. One hundred twenty-seven students from the School of 
Education and the School of Occupational Therapy in Jerusalem 
participated in the study. The questionnaires were randomly distributed 
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between the subjects: N(A,B) = 29, N(AOB) =25, N(B~A) = 26, N(A/B) = 25 
N(B/A) • 22. 
Results 
The same analyses were performed here as in Experiment 1, Again, 
group (AAB) and (BnA) were combined, with no significant difference 
between (AnB) and (B~A) estimates in 13 of 14 questions. Table 2 
presents medians. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
In every case, the median estimate of the conjunction (column 5) 
was greater than the mean of the two normative equivalents (column 6). 
The size of this effect (as expressed by the difference between columns 
5 and 6) was greater here than in Experiment 1 (Mann-Whitney U = 10, 
p < 0.05), Indeed, the conjunction was so overestimated that it was not 
the smallest of the probabilities (see last row in Table 2), Whereas 
the estimates for (A), (B), (A/B), and (B/A) differed significantly 
between the two experiments (the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranked 
2 test) , estimates of (AAB) were much greater in Experiment 2 (T = 0, 
p < 0.0001). 
Again, there was no difference between the dependent and independent 
pairs. 
Discussion of Experiments 1 and 2 
With both response modes subjects overestimated the conjunction, 
however, the bias was larger when subjects were asked about chances than 
when asked about percentages. Although in Experiment 1 the conjunction 
was overestimated, it's relative frequency was still perceived as smaller 
than the relative frequency of each one of the components, This, however, 
was not the case in Experiment 2. Here subjects did not judge the 
probability of the conjunctive event as smaller than the probabilities 
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of the components. This difference between the two experiments refutes 
one possible explanation as being the sole explanation for the over-
confidence. According to it people do perceive the conjunction as the 
event with the smallest probability but as they tend to overestimate 
small numbers (Attneave, 1953; Muller, & Edmonds, 1967) the probability 
of the conjunction is overestimated. This can explain the results of 
Experiment 1 but not of Experiment 2. 
Why is the conjunction overestimated more in Experiment 2 than in 
Experiment l? One possible explanation assumes that subjects adopte a 
different strategy when assessing probability than when assessing 
percentages, even when the events in question are the same repetitive 
events. According to this explanation, the translation of a probability 
question about a specific person (What are the chances that he wears 
glasses?) into a relative frequency question about a population (What 
percentage of all people wear glasses?) is not immediate and natural, 
and not done often by subjects. Furthermore, when thinking about 
percentages, there is no reason to assume that subjects decompose the 
conjunctive event before estimating its relative frequency even though 
it may appear to them that the conjunction event has a smaller relative 
frequency than either of the component events. For the subjects there 
is no essential difference between a component event and a compound one. 
This assumption may not hold for subjects who are asked to assess 
probabilities. For them, it may not seem obvious that the probability 
of a conjunctive event must be smaller than the components' probabilities. 
They also may find it more difficult to assess the probability of a 
conjunctive event than the probability of a component event, regardless 
of the interpretation they give to the probability question (as long as 
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it is not consistently a relative-frequency interpretation). To 
overcome this difficulty, they may have decomposed the conjunctive event 
into its elements (A and B), assessed the relative probabilities and 
then recomposed the estimates in an inappropriate manner, thus giving 
biased conjunctive estimates. There is no reason to believe that 
subjects intuitively adopt a multiplication formula for aggregating the 
components' probabilities. Simple additive models will result in 
probabilities not significantly smaller than the components' probabilities. 
The assumed inappropriate integration of the assessed elements' chances 
is tested in Experiments 3 and 4. 
EXPERIMENTS 3 AND 4: A WITHIN-SUBJECT DESIGN 
Experiments 3 and 4 examined the integration process with a within-
subject design. Each subject was given information about the chances 
of three events [e.g., (B/ A), (A), (B)] ,and asked to assess the chances 
of a fourth [e.g., (AOB)). In such a design, any bias in the estimates 
can be blamed upon a wrong integration since the decomposition was 
already done by the experimenter. In the discussion of Experiment 2, 
it was assumed that subjects perceived the conjunctive event as a 
compound one and therefore used the "decomposition-recomposition" strategy. 
No such strategy was assumed to be adopted for the evaluation of P(A), 
P(B), P(A/B), and P(B/A). However, in a within-subject design, in 
which subjects are presented with the probabilities of the essential 
components, any probability can be assessed by the "decomposition-
recomposition" strategy depending on the experimental manipulation 
[e.g., present P(A/B), P(AnB) and ask about P(B)]. Thus, in Experiments 
3 and 4 subjects were asked to assess either the conjunctive event 
[given P(A), P(B), and one con~itional] or the conditional one [given 
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P(A), P(B}, and the conjunction]. 
Experiments 3 and 4 use somewhat different stimuli. The same 
demographic variables used in Experiment 1 and 2 were employed in 
Experiment 3, whereas Experiment 4 used symbolic variables in order to 
prevent subjects from using outside information not given by the 
experimenter. As with Experiments 1 and 2, the two following experiments 
will be described sequentially except for the discussion which will be 
presented, for both, following the results of Experiment 4. 
Experiment 3: Demographic Variables 
Method 
Stimuli. The median percentages of (A), (B), (A/B), and (B/A) from 
Experiment 2 were given to subjects in this experiment. Rather than 
using the too-high median conjunctive estimates from that experiment, 
new ones were computed by taking P(A/B)P(B); P(B/A)P(A) for each pair 
of events and multiplying it by 100 to get percentages. 3 
Design and procedure. Four groups of subjects were given different 
combinations of the above information and were asked to estimate the 
likelihood of different events. Each group of subjects received 14 
questions comprised of a set of data, and a request to estimate a 
missing datum. Three pieces of information were presented in each 
question: P(A), P(B), and one of the following three: P(B/A) in group l, 
P(A/B) in group 2, and P(A~B) in groups 3 and 4. The estimated datum 
was one of three: P(AnB) in groups land 2, P(B/A) in group 3, and 
P(A/B) in group 4. Each of the seven question pages contained a 
dependent and an independent question, they were randomly ordered for 
• 
different subjects. All subjects received the same instructions: 
In a certain governmental office, there is a computer which 
stores a list of 100,000 men. Upon instruction, the computer 
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randomly chooses a name of a person from this list. In every 
one of the following questions, you will be given data about the 
chances of the computer to actually randomly choose a name of 
a person with one or more specific characteristics. With the 
help of this data, you will be asked to estimate the chances 
that the computer will randomly select a person with a 
characteristic related to those mentioned in the data. You 
are requested to rely only on the given data and not on any 
information you think you have. We don't expect you to know 
the exact answer to the questions; we are only interested in 
your estimates concerning the chances of such events. Please 
write your answers in percentages: give any number between 0 
(no chance whatsoever) and 100 (for sure). 
Subjects. One hundred first-year students in the Geography Department 
and School of Education in the Hebrew University in Jerusalem participated 
in this experiment. The experiment was administered as the previous ones, 
resulting in: N1 = 27, N2 = 27, N3 = 20, N4 = 26, 
Results 
The first three columns of Table 3 show the data presented. to groups 
1 and 2; column 4 presents the median estimated conjunction; column 5 
presents the computed conjunction, Table 4 presents the data presented 
to groups 3 and 4 (columns 1, 2, and 3), the median estimated conditionals 
(column 4), and the computed conditionals (column 5). 
--------------------------------
Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here 
--------------------------------
The most striking results were the similarities between the 
conditionals given and the conjunctions estimated in Table 3 and between 
the conjunctions given and the conditionals estimated in Table 4. In 
7 out of 28 cases, in Table 3, the median estimated conjunction is 
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identical to the given conditional, Even more prominent is the situation 
observed in Table 4: In 12 out of 28 comparisons, the median estimated 
conditional is identical to the given conjunction and in 3 more cases, 
it is higher in one percent only. 
Groups 1 and 2 (Table 3). Column 6 presents for each question the 
proportion of subjects whose estimated conjunctions was smaller than the 
given conditional; column 7 presents the results of a binomial test on 
each proportion. In 13 out of 28 cases, the estimated conjunction was 
as likely to be larger as to be smaller than the given conditional, 
reflecting the overestimation of the conjunction. For 14 of the remaining 
15 questions (in which the estimated conjunction was significantly 
smaller than the given conditional), the estimated conjunction was 
significantly higher than the computed conjunction (columns 8 and 9). 
Out of 632 conjunction estimates, only 223 were smaller than all given 
elements, 
Groups 3 and 4 (Table 4). In 23 out of 28 cases there was no 
significant difference between the estimated conditional and.the given 
conjunction, reflecting the underestimation of the conditional (columns 
6 and 7), For each of the remaining 5 questions the estimated condtional 
was still significantly smaller than the computed conditional. 
Clearly, the conjunction is overestimated and similar to the given 
conditional, whereas the conditional is underestimated and similar to 
the given conjunction. 
Experiment 4: S)'E:'!bolic Variables 
Method 
Stimuli. Four pairs of probabilities [P(A), P(B)] were chosen for 
this experiment: (.70, .30), (,70, .70), (.30, .30), and (.SO, .SO). 
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For each pair, three different conditional probabilities were selected: 
P(A/B) = P(A), P(A/B) < P(A), and P(A/B) > P(A). Thus, there were 12 
groups of data (4 x 3). For each one P(B/A) and P(AOB) were calculated, 
Each problem was composed of three data pieces and one question. For 
the three cases in which P(A) ~ P(B), three different problems were 
constructed for each case: 
1. Data: P(A), P(B), P(AOB) Question: P(A/B) 
2. Data: P(A), P(B), P(A/B) Question: P(A<B) 
3. Data: P(A), P(B), P(B/A) Question: P(A<B) 
thus making 9 questions. For the nine cases in which P(A) = P(B), only 
the first two problems were constructed for each to avoid redundancy 
[since if P(A) = P(B) then P(A/B) = P(B/A)]. 
Design and procedure. The 27 questions (9 + 18) were distributed 
between six questionnaires so that no two questions based on the same 
data were in the same questinnaire. The phrasing of the questions was 
similar to Experiment 3, except for use of the terms "attribute A," 
"attribute A and B," etc., instead of the specified characteristics. 
Subjects. One hundred ten students in a teachers' seminar in 
Jerusalem participated in this experiment. The experiment was administered 
as the previous ones. 
Results 
Tables 5 and 6 are analogous to Tables 3 and 4 from Experiment 3. 
In all but the five cases in which the given conditional was very high 
(70% or 90%), there was no significant difference between the conditional 
and the estimated conjunction (Table 5, columns 3 and 5). Except for 
the four cases in which the given conjunction was very small (9% or less), 
there was no significant difference between the conjunction and the 
estimated conditional (Table 6, columns 3 and 5). 
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Insert Tables 5 and 6 about here 
--------------------------------
Discussion of Experiments 3 and 4 
The results of ,the last two experiments show that when we decompose 
the problem for the subjects, they show two biases: estimates of the 
conjunction are too high; estimates of the conditional are too low. In 
both cases, the estimates of the conditional and the intersection, are 
too similar. These results strengthen the proposed explanation for the 
results of Experiment 2. There it was suggested that subjects were 
conscious of the conjunction's composite character and that their error 
lay in non-normative integration of the estimated elements. Such awareness 
was due to the composite formulation of the conjunctive questions--"A 
and B." By way of contrast, they did not decompose the conditional 
question in Experiment 2 because its formulation does not call for it. 
In experiments 3 and 4, the two estimates (conjunction and conditional) 
were decomposed for the subjects forcing them to employ a recomposition 
strategy for both estimates. 
How do we explain the similarity between the conjunction and the 
conditional? Though the verbal phrasing of conditional and intersection 
may be perceived as similar, thus causing some confusion between the 
two, this does not seem to explain the data. Such confusion should be 
manifested independently of the order of magnitude of the given data 
(a given conditional when assessing a conjunction and a given conjunction 
when assessing the conditional). However, this is not the case in 
Experiment 3, where the conjunctive estimates were clearly smaller than 
the given conditionals when the latter were high, and the conditional 
estimates were clearly higher than the given conjunctiors,when the 
latter were very small. 
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Assuming subjects do differentiate between a conditional datum 
and a conjunctive question (and between a conjunctive datum and a 
conditional question), they integrate the data in a way that produces 
similar results, similar enough to avoid statistical differences 
(between the given conditional and the estimated conjunction and 
between the given conjunction and the estimated conditional). The 
similarity between column 5 and the last column in Table 5 suggests 
one possible way. For conjunction estimates, subjects may have 
averaged the given prior and conditional probabilities [either P(A) and 
P(A/B) or the given P(B) and P(B/A)]. However, only in 12 of 200 
evaluations in which the given conditional was different from the prior 
probability, the estimated conjunction was similar to the above average, 
thus the simple averaging model can be rejected. Another possibility 
is that subjects anchored on the conditional when estimating.the 
conjunction, whereas when estimating the conditional they anchored on 
the conjunction. In both cases, they changed their estimates some, 
but not enough to reflect the prior probabilities. Insufficient adjustment 
from a starting point (anchor) has been suggested previously as a 
possible explanation for the overestimation of conjunctive events and 
the underestimation of disjunctive events by Tversky and Kahneman (1974). 
EXPERIMENT 5: CONJUNCTIVE PROBABILITY JUDGMENT FROM SPECIFIC DATA 
All four previous experiments were done in a frequentistic context, 
one in which it is easy to view the event as a member of a set and equate 
probability with its relative frequency in that set. However, people 
often assess chances in situations in which it is hard to conceive of 
the event in question as a member of a group and thereby be able to rely 
on group frequencies. For example, the probability that an individual, 
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with some known characteristics, is a member of a certain category 
(categorical prediction) can be assessed by thinking about the percentage 
of individuals with the same characteristics who are in that category. 
However, if we know much about that individual (the number of 
characteristics is high}, it might be difficult to relate him to a 
group of people "similar to him 11 because it is such a small group, 
because it is an unnatural one to think about or because he is a unique 
person and there is no one similar to him. 
In these cases, probability assessment will probably be based on 
other strategies. Kahneman and Tversky (1972, 1973) suggested that 
when the event in question is perceived as unique, people will rely on 
the "representativeness heuristic." Users of this h~uristic judge an 
individual's membership in a category to be likely to the extent that 
the individual's description is similar to the category's main features. 
The similarity between an individual's description and a category 
archetype can be manipulated by changing the description or the category. 
Letting D be a given description and A be a feature defining a category, 
one can add a feature B to A such that D will be judged as more 
representative of (AOB) than of (A). Of course, normatively speaking, 
the probability of (AnB/D) must be smaller than that of (A/D). However, 
if people rely on representativeness, the opposite will be true, that is, 
the probability of the conjunction will be judged higher than that of 
its components. Adding a feature C to the description D such that (D~C) 
will be judged as more representative of A than D was when alone, will 
cause subjects to judge P(A/DOC) > P(A/D). In doing so, however, they 
would not necessarily be violating any normative rule. The following 
experiment was designed to test these hypotheses. 
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Method 
Stimuli, Three short life stories about three different characters 
were constructed fitting different Israeli stereotypes. For each story, 
three events (A, B, and C) were selected so that A and B would intuitively 
fit the character in the story, whereas event C would not and so that A 
would be perceived as relating to B, but not to C. The stories and 
events are listed in the upper part of Table 7. 
Insert Table 7 about here 
-------------------------
Design and procedure. Subjective estimates were elicited for the 
following probabilities: P(A), P(B), P(C), P(Af\B), P(AnC), P(A/B), P(B/A), 
P(C/A), and P(A/C). All probability questions had the same formulation: 
"What are the chances that David is ______ ?" 
Seven questionnaires were constructed, each with the three stories 
on different pages, randomly ordered. After reading each story, subject~ 
were asked one or two questions (see lower part of Table 7). 
Subjects. One hundred and eighty-three soldiers (all high school 
graduates) participated in this experiment. The experiment was 
administered as the previous ones. 
Results 
Manipulation check. Table 8 presents the median probabilities. 
Our intuitions concerning their relative magnitude were justified: 
P(A) and P(B) were judged relatively high, whereas P(C) was judged 
relatively low. However, the absolute magnitude of all three appears 
much too high, reflecting insensitivity to base rate (Bar-Hillel, 1980). 
The small amount of low-diagnosticity information given about Danny in 
Story 1 does not warrant an increase of probability from a very low 
base rate (i.e., the percentage of graphic students among 23 year-old 
adults in Israel) to a probability of .7. Similar arguments can be 
advanced for each one of the estimates in Table 8. 
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Insert Table 8 about here 
Conjunctive estimates, The conjunctions (A~B) and (AdC) were 
overwhelmingly overestimated. None was smaller than the smallest of 
their components' estimates. Table 9 presents 12 comparisons between 
probabilities for conjunctions and for their components, The chances 
of (AnB) were significantly higher than those of (A) in one out of 
three cases, and significantly higher than (B) in two out of three 
cases. The chances of (AqC) were significantly smaller than those of 
(A) in two out of three cases and higher than (C) in one case. As 
expected, (ARB) was judged significantly higher than (ARC) in all three 
stories. 
Insert Table 9 about here 
-------------------------
Conditional estimates. Table 10 compares the conditionals. When 
P(A) = P(B), no difference is expected between P(A/B) and P(B/A). As 
the estiIDated chances of P(A) and P(B) were quite similar (Table 8) it 
is not surprising that no significant difference was found between the 
chances of (A/B) and (B/A)(row 2), 
--------------------------
Insert Table 10 about here 
------------------------~ 
In (B/A) and (A/B) the conditional event added positively related 
information to the given description, According to the representativeness 
hypothesis, the added information increases the similarity between the 
datum and the event, making the conditionals (B/A) and (A/B) seem more 
likely than (B) and (A), respectively. This expectation was confirmed 
in 5 out of 6 cases (rows 1 and 3), 
The addition of (A) to data which were already judged as not very 
representative of C decreases the probability of (C) in one case only 
(row 4). The addition of C to the same description did not affect (A)'s 
probability judgment (row 6). 
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Because of the above similarities [between P(C/A) and P(C) and 
between P(A/C) and P(A)], and because the chances of (C) appeared 
smaller than those of (A), it is not surprising that the chances of 
(C/A) were smaller than those of (A/C)(row 5). 
Discussion 
It was hypothesized that with unique events subjects judge probabilities 
according to the extent that the data represents this event. Therefore, 
a conjunction, (A~B) should be judged higher than the priors, (A,B), if 
the data appear more similar to (A~B) than to A and to B. These 
predictions were confirmed. Similarly, the conditional (B/A) should be 
judged more likely than the prior (B) if (DnA) is perceived as more 
similar to B than is D alone. This prediction was also supported, 
These results confirm and expand upon a set of unpublished results 
by Tversky and Kahneman (Note 1). For each of several descriptions, 
Tversky and Kahneman selected five characteristics, one similar to the 
description, one dissimilar, and three unrelated. After each description, 
subjects were presented with all five characteristics as well as with 
the conjunction of the similar and dissimilar ones. Half the subjects 
ranked the stimuli according to their similarity to the description, 
half ranked them according to their probability given the description. 
They found that the similarity ranking and the probability ranking 
were very similar and that the conjunctive (similarity and probability) 
ranking was the average of the similar characteristic ranking and the 
dissimilar characteristic ranking. These results are in line with the 
present ones concerning P(A~C). The probability of this conjunction 
may be judged to be between that of A (a similar characteristic) and that 
of C (a dissimilar one). 
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These results also confirm some preliminary findings reported by 
Slavic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein (1976) for a similar task; the 
assessed probability of a scenario was a direct function of the number 
of its links (1, 2, or 3), when the linked events formed a coherent 
story; the more links the higher the assessed probability. 
In categorical predictions, when subjects rely on the representativeness 
heuristic as a guide for probability assessment, the conjunction is 
perceived as a compound event for which no decomposition is needed and 
its probability is assessed according to how similar the data are to the 
compound event. 
EXPERIMENT 6: CONJUNCTIVE PROBABILITY JUDGMENT IN TUROFF'S EVENTS 
Judgment by representativeness is one possible strategy people 
adopt when assessing probabilities of unique events. Using it, subjects 
compare two images and judge their similarity. The possible effects of 
this strategy on conjunctive estimates has already been demonstrated. 
However, judgment by similarity is not the only strategy people rely on; 
causal reasoning is a second one, which has been recently perceived as 
an important determinant of judgment under uncertainty (Jones, Kanouse, 
Kelley, Nisbett, Valens, & Weiner, 1972; Tversky, & Kahneman, 1980). 
Whereas in judgment by representativeness one compares two images (events, 
categories) by way of assessing the similarity between the two, in 
causal reasoning one judges the causal effects of one event upon a 
following one. The perception of a time gap between the evidence and 
the event in question is a necessary condition for any causal reasoning. 
The effect of causal reasoning on probability judgments of conditional 
events was studied by Tversky and Kahneman (1980). They claimed that in 
any conditional event (A/B) where there is a perceived causal link between 
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A and B, B can be perceived as causing A, thus B being a causal datum 
[given that David hit Danny (B), what is the probability that Danny 
broke his leg (A)?], or A can be perceived as causing B, hence B being 
a diagnostic datum [given that Mr. Jacob has abdominal pains (B), what 
is the probability that he has an appendix infection (A)?]. Tversky and 
Kahneman demonstrated how greater impact is assigned to causal than to 
diagnostic data of equal informativeness; Furthermore, they showed how 
the dominance of causal over diagnostic considerations can produce 
inconsistent and paradoxical conditional probability assessments. 
Specifically, they tested subjects' judgments of conditional probabilities 
in cases where the events A and B were such that the occurrence of B (e.g., 
the number of deaths attributed to mercury poisoning during the next 
five years exceeds 500) increases the perceived likelihood of the 
subsequent occurrence of A (within the next five years, Congress will 
pass a law to curb mercury pollution), but where the occurrence of A 
decreases the perceived likelihood of the subsequent occurrence of B. 
Such questions were originally introduced by Turoff (1972) in a discussion 
of the cross impact method of forecasting. 
Subjects in Tversky and Kahneman's experiment judged that P(A/B) > 
P(A/B) and P(B/A) < P(B/A) in contrast to the rules of probability theory 
according to which, if P(A/B) > P(A/B), then P(B/A) > P(B/A). Subjects 
assume that the conditional event happens before the conditioned one 
and assess the causal strength from the conditional to the conditioned. 
It is here assumed that causal reasoning in such pairs of events 
can affect the judgments of conjunctions as well as the conditionals' 
judgments and cause two biases: The first is that P(AnB) will be judged 
higher than P(A) and P(B) because the same data will be perceived as 
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explaining more in (AnB) than in A or B alone. For example, when people 
judge the probability of "death from mercury poisoning," they probably 
look for relevant information (e.g., the free use of mercury today, etc.) 
and judge whether it causes or prevents the event in question and how 
much it explains it. When they have to judge the two events--"death from 
mercury poisoning" and 11 a law to cure mercury pollution"--this same data 
is perceived as explaining more in the sequence of events than in one 
of them alone, thus causing higher probability to (AOB) than to A or to 
B alone. 
The second assumed predicted bias is that P(AnB) and P{BllA) may not 
be judged as identical since people will perceive the first mentioned 
event as the cause and the second as the result. A (deaths) after B 
(law) will not be perceived as a probable sequence, but B after A will. 
The following experiment was designed to test these expectations. 
Method 
Stimuli. Five pairs of events were selected such that A causes B 
and B prevents A, All events were presented as future events projected 
to occur within the following year. All events were unique in the sense 
described in Experiment 5. 
Design and procedure. Six statements were constructed for each pair of 
events: P(A), P(B), P(A/B), P(B/A), P(AnB), and P(BnA). All statements 
began: "There is a chance that in the next year •••• " Three different 
questionnaires were prepared. In, two of the questionnaires, subjects 
were asked to rank P(A), P(B/A), and P(BflA) in three pairs of events and 
P(B), P(A/B), and P(AnB) in the additional two. The questions were 
manipulated in the two questionnaires so as to get both rankings for 
each pair of events. In the third questionnaire, subjects were asked 
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to rank P(A) and P(AnB) in 3 pairs of events and P(B) and P(BnA) in the 
l 
additional two. 
Subjects. The 3 questionnaires were randomly distributed among 







= 42). All questionnaires were in English, the 
subjects' native language. 
Results 
The triple comparison. For each pair of events, two tables were 
constructed, one for each triple (Table 11). The rows of the tables 
indicate the three probabilities considered, whereas the columns indicate 
the possible ranks. For each probability we circled the most frequent 
rank. The same was done for the combined results of the 5 event-pairs 
(lower part of Table 11). 
Insert Table 11 about here 
In 4 of the 5 tables P(B/A) > P(A) > P(BnA), Also in 4 of the 5, 
P(AnB) > P(B) > P(A/B). 
The paired-comparison. For each of the 5 pairs of events, subjects 
indicated whether the conjunction probability was higher than, lower 
than, or as similar to the one component probability. Of the subjects 
who judged P(AflB) to be different from P(A), 31/39, 29/39, and 26/36 
judged the conjunction as higher for questions 1, 3, and 5, respectively 
(z = 3.52, p < 0.001; z = 2.88, p < 0.002; z = 2.5, p < 0.006). Of the 
subjects who judged P(B~A) to be different from P(B), 27/40 and 28/37 
judged the conjunction as smaller, for questions 2 and 4 (z = 2.05, 
p < 0.02; z = 2.96, p < 0.001). Thus, according to subjects' perceptions: 
P(AnB) > P(A) and P(BnA) < P(B). 
Taken together, the results from the three questionnaires yield for 
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questions 1, 3, and 5: P(AnB) > P(A) > P(BnA) and for questions 2 and 4: 
P(BflA) < P(B) < P(AOB), 
Discussion 
The results confirm our predictions. It is obvious that subjects 
judge the first element mentioned in the conjunction as happening first. 
The two elements together are perceived as one event; with "A and B11 
perceived as high (A causes B) but "B and A11 perceived as low (A prevents 
B), Furthermore, P(AnB) is judged more probable than P(A) and P(B). 
As representativeness is blamed for conjunction overestimation in 
categorical prediction, so is causal reasoning blamed for the same bias 
in Turoff's events. 
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
In all but the first of these six studies, subjects overestimated 
the conjunction, often perceiving it as more likely than the priors 
and conditionals. Although these results were similar, I propose that 
they are best accounted for by rather different processes, 
In assessing a conjunction, the subject can choose one of two 
general strategies: 
(a) Decompose the problem to its elements A and B, assess their 
probabilities separately, and then combine these estimates. 
(b) Assess the conjunction directly. 
The strategy chosen depends on: 
(1) Whether the subject receives the information necessary to 
compute the result. When the subject is faced with information about 
the probability of the relevant elements, he is actually directed to 
use the first strategy. .If the problem is not presented decomposed, 
the subject is more free to choose between the two strategies. 
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(2) Whether there is a causal relation between the two events. 
When there is a causal relation, there is a tendency to see the two 
events as one and avoid decomposition. 
(3) Whether the context is perceived as frequentistic or unique. 
A frequentistic context strengthens the tendency to decompose, whereas 
a unique context weakens this tendency. 
Even when the task encourages decomposition, the integration of 
the estimated components need not fit the multiplicative model. Adding 
or averaging would result in a conjunction estimate higher than at 
least one of the priors or conditionals, as demonstrated in Experiment 
3 and 4. In these, subjects were tested only for their integration 
processes since the relevant components were presented to them. On the 
basis of the similarity between the estimated conjunction and the given 
condition~l, a reasonable hypothesis is that subjects do not use the 
multiplication model, but anchor on the conditional and change it a bit 
to get the conjunction. 
Experiment 2 differs from 3 and 4 only in the first dimension; the 
problem is not decomposed for the subject and he is free to choose 
between the two strategies. However, in the two remaining dimensions, 
it resembles Experiments 3 and 4: frequentistic information was given 
and no causal relation existed between the two events. It is argued 
that subjects in this experiment chose the decomposition strategy. This 
explanation is consistent with the differences between the estimates of 
(AnB) in Experiments 1 (percentage) and 2 (probability). 
When the experimental design encourages holistic judgment (because 
there is a causal relation between A and Band/or the context is unique), 
subjects rely on judgmental heuristics such as representativeness and 
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causal reasoning. In Experiments 5 and 6, all three factors (1, 2, and 3) 
strengthened the tendency to handle the conjunction as one event and to 
avoid decomposition, The problems were not decomposed for the subject, 
there was a causal relation between A and B, and no information was 
given concerning the sample space, In thosesituations, subjects do not 
rely on relative frequency considerations, but on different heuristics. 
In categorical predictions (like those in Experiment 5), subjects rely 
on the representativness heuristic and judge how similar the data are 
to the event in question. In Turoff's events(such as those in Experiment 
6), subjects rely on causal reasoning and judge how the data explains 
the event in question, The rules of similarity judgment and causal 
reasoning do not necessarily obey the rules of probability. Specifically, 
data can be more similar to (A~B) than to (A), or explain more in (AAB) 
than in (A). However, in the light of the same data, the chances of (AnB) 
are always smaller than those of A. 
Practical implications. We have demonstrated the fallacy of the 
conjunctive overestimation and analyzed its causes. Next we should 
consider how this bias can be overcome. Planners in most of the fields 
engage (or should engage) in the assessment of conjunctive probabilities 
while considering the probability of event sequences. Since they 
frequently perceive the situation as unique, they probably rely often 
on representativeness and causal reasoning rather than decomposing 
the problem into its elements and recombining them, Those heuristics 
can easily bring about a situation in whiCh the more elements the event 
has, the more probable its perceived probability. 
Assessment by decomposition can partly overcome the biases caused 
by the above intuitive heuristics. Decomposition calls for: 
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1. Decompose the problem whenever possible. 
2. Decompose it to its appropriate elements: P(A/B) and P(B) or 
P(B/A) and P(A). 
3. Assess the components' probabilities. 
4. Let the formula do the integrating. 
These steps will ensure the correct inference of the conjunction's 
probability from the conjunction--components' probabilities and thus 
ensure that the conjunction's probability will be small. However, they 
do not overcome biases in the assessments of the components' probabilities 
which may be influenced by the same intuitive heuristics--representativeness 
and causal reasoning. 
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Reference Notes 
1, Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D, Unpublished data. 
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1. The medians were preferred to the mean;since most distributions 
were skewed to the right. 
2. For each one of the 14 questions, the difference between the 
two medians of the two experiments was calculated. Under Ho, if we rank 
the absolute differences across the questions, we will expect the sum 
of the ranks relating to negative differences to be identical to the 
sum of the ranks relating to positive differences. Tis the smaller of 
the two sums. 
3. This was done for 13 out of 14 questions. In question 4, as 
the derived (AIIB) was higher than one of the component's chances (B), 
the chosen estimate for (AnB) was based on the smaller of the two 
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Table 1 
EXPERIMENT 1: Median Relative-Frequency Estimates 
Group 1 1 4 5 2,3 Derived 
Estimate (A) (B) (A/B) (B/A) (AOB) (A/B)(B) + (B/A)(A) 
2 X 100 
1. 70 15 10 6.75 5 3.1 
2 . 40 17 .5 25 10 12.5 3.7 
• a 3. 67.5 35 90 50 40 33 .... • .. 
u 4. 42.5 10 60 40 10 11.5 
" • "" 5. 26.5 21 70 47.5 15 13.6 " • ..• 6. 2.5 10 10 90 5 1.6 "" " .... 
7. 80 40 80 50 50 36 
• 8. 10 20 22.5 25 5 3.5 a .... • 9 . 8 49 5 42.5 3 2.9 .. 
u 
" 10 . 45 72.5 35 70 35 25.5 • "" " • 11. 67.5 30 65 30 20 19.9 .. • "" 12. 76 40 80 60 50 38.8 
13. 60 60 70 60 47.5 39 
14. 8 5 5 5 2 0.3 
Mean a Rank 3. 68 2.75 3.89 3.21 1.46 
a Rank 1 corresponds to the smallest value in each row. 
Table 2 
EXPERIMENT 2: Median Chance Estimates 
Derived 
Group l l 4 5 2,3 (A/B)(B) + (B/A)(A) 
Estimates (A) (B) (B/ A) (A/B) (AOB) 2 X 100 
1. 65 10 10 10 25 3.7 
2. 43 25 32.5 15 30 7.3 
• ... 3. 65 42.5 77.5 70 70 39.2 .... • 0. 
u 4. 40 10 50 50 40 12.5 
" • "' 5. 30 25 60 40 30 13.5 " • 0. • 6. 5 20 25 90 20 4. 7 "' " .... 
7. 70 40 87.5 55 70 36.7 
• 8. 20 25 10 20 20 3.2 ... .... • 9. 10 40 5 27.5 10 2.4 0. 
u 
" 10. 40 80 40 80 60 32 • 'a • 11. 70 20 50 25 40 13. 7 0. • "' 12. 80 50 62.5 42.5 65 32.6 
13. 70 77 .5 60 55 70 42.5 
14. 5 9 5 7.5 5 0.4 
Mean Rank 3.14 2. 71 3.14 2.96 3.03 
Table 3 
EXPERIMENT 3 : The Conjunction Estimates 
from Given Priors and Conditional 
Prop. of Est. Prop.of Est. 
smaller than greater than 
Data given true 
(B/ A)a 
Median Calcu-conditional conjunction 
Ques. E13timated lated d d No. (A) (B) (A/B) b (AOB) (AOB) C C p • p • 
65 
lOa 5 6.5 12/15 0.02 8/19 
l. 10 lOb 10 l 12/18 
2. 43 25 15 11 6.4 11/17 33 25 8.2 18/21 0.001 23/25 0.001 
3. 65 43 70 57.5 45.5 16/17 0.001 14/20 0.06 78 50 33.5 20/21 0.001 20/24 0.001 
4. 40 10 50 30 20 16/18 0.002 14/18 0.01 50 30 5 15/16 0.001 22/24 0.001 
5. 30 25 40 36.5 12 11/15 60 57.5 15 15/18 0.001 21/23 0.001 
6. 5 20 90 40 4.5 13/18 0.05 15/19 0.01 25 25 5 11/21 
7. 70 40 55 56 38.5 11/19 . 88 70 35.2 20/22 0.001 20/26 0.003 
8. 20 25 20 10 4 14/17 0.006 18/18 0.001 10 10 2.5 11/20 
9. 10 40 28 20 2.8 16/19 0.002 19/20 0.001 5 5 2 10/19 
10. 40 80 86 40 32 18/18 0.001 14/19 0.03 40 40 32 9/16 
11. 70 20 
25 20 17.5 10/17 
50 47.5 10 13/18 0.05 22/24 0.001 
12. 80 50 42 43.5 33.6 9/13 62 62 31 12/21 
13. 70 77 55 60 38.5 7/17 60 60 46.2 7/19 
14. 5 9 
7 2 6.35 18/19 0.001 20/20 0.001 
5 3 0.45 14/18 0.02 24/26 0.001 
a 
Group 1 
b Group 2 
C The proportion was calculated only for those estimates which 
were different from the compared estimates 
d Blank spaces indicate a: > .05 
Table 4 
EXPERIMENT 3: The Conditional Estimates 
from Given Priors and Conjunction 
Prop.of Est. Prop. of Est. 
greater than smaller than 
given true 
Data Median Calcu- conjunction conditional 
Ques. Estimated lated 
d d No. (A) (B) (MB) Cond. Cond. C C p • p • 
1. 65 10 4 2,5 6.1• 9/23 4 40b 13/20 
2. 43 25 7 5 16.3 8/22 21 28 18/20 0.001 18/26 0.02 
3. 65 43 39 39 60 12/23 40 90. 7 14/21 
4. 40 10 5 6 12,5 14/20 15 50 16/19 0.002 25/26 0.001 
5, 30 25 14 15 46.7 14/24 40 56 13/21 
6. 5 20 4 20 80 22/24 0.001 19/25 0.006 
5 20 15/20 
7. 70 40 37 37 52.8 12/22 50 92.5 16/19 0.002 25/26 0.001 
8. 20 25 3 5 15 14/22 8 12 16/19 0.002 19/26 . 0.001 
9. 10 40 2 2 20 12/16 2 5 9/15 
10. 40 80 32 40 80 15/22 32 40 12/20 
11. 70 20 14 18 20 16/24 18 70 14/20 
12. 80 50 33 33 41.2 12/22 33 66 12/22 
13. 70 77 42 42 60 13/23 42 54.5 12/20 
14. 5 9 1 1 20 8/17 1 11.1 11/16 
a (B/A) Group 3 
b (A/BJ Group 4 
C 
The proportion was calculated only for those estimates that 
were different from the compared estimate 
d Blank spaces indicate = > • 05 
Table 5 
EXPERIMENT 4: The Conjunction Estimates 
from Given Priors and Conditionals 
Prop.of Est. Prop.of Est. 
smaller than greater than 
given true 
Median Cal cu-conditional conjunction 
Ques. Given Estimated lated 
.b .b No. (A) (B) Cond. (A~B) (AnB) Pa Pa 
1. 70 70 90 80 63 10/10 0.001 13/19 
2. 30 30 90 60 27 10/11 0.006 14/15 0.001 
3. 50 50 90 65 45 14/15 0.001 13/19 
4. 70 30 90 85 27 9/10 0.01 15/18 0.001 
5. 70 30 70 47.5 21 10/13 0.05 13/14 0.001 
6. 70 70 70 70 49 3/ 5 
7. 70 70 61 63 42.7 5/11 
8. 50 50 50 50 25 5/ 9 
9. 70 30 38.6c 38.6 27 8/16 
10. 30 30 30 30 9 1/ 7 
11. 70 30 30c 40 21 4/16 
12. 70 30 23 23 6.9 7/16 
13. 70 30 10c 30 7 0 
14. 30 30 10 20 3 1/12 
15. 50 50 10 40 5 1/13 
a The proportion was calculated only for those estimates which 
were different from the compared estimates 





















C The given conditionals indicated with a 11 c 11 were (B/A); all others 
were (A/B). 
Table 6 
EXPERIMENT 4: The Conditional Estimates 
from Given Priors and Conjunction 
Prop.of Est. Prop.of Est. 
greater than smaller than 
true given 
Data Median Calcu-conjunction conditional 
Ques. Est. lated b b No, (A) (B) (AnB) Cond. Cond. a a p « p « 
1. 30 30 3 15 10 13/13 0.001 5/14 
2, 50 50 5 22,5 10 12/12 0.001 3/12 
3, 70 30 7 10 23 11/12 0.003 4/15 0.06 
4. 30 30 9 20 30 11/15 0.06 10/16 
5, 70 30 21 23 70 8/13 
6, 50 50 25 25 50 4/ 8 
7. 30 30 27 27 90 8/15 
8, 70 30 27 37 90 10/14 
9. 70 70 43 43 61 5/10 
10, 50 50 45 45 90 7/11 
11. 70 70 49 49 70 7/19 
12. 70 70 63 59 90 4/ 7 
a The proportion was calculated only for those estimates which 
were different from the compared estimates. 
b Blank spaces indicate~> .05 
Table 7 
EXPERIMENT 5: Distribution of Data (Stories) 
and Questions (Events) across Questionnaires 
Story 1 
"In his childhood, Danny 
was prominent in his love 
for drawing and graphic 
work and took part in 
many relevant classes. 
After he finished high 
school, he went into the 
army and then spent two 
years abroad." 
(A) He studied in a·graphics 
art school 
(B) He is a draftsman 
(C) He works as an accountant 
1. P(A) 
2. P (B)' P(C) 
3. P(AnB) 
4. P(AflC) 





"Isaac is a member of a 
religious family. He is 
tall, well built, and a 
chatterer. He studied 
in a special 'Yeshiva', 
after which he served in 
the army in a combat 
unit. Today, he is 23 
years old." 
Events 
He is a member of 
"Gush-Emunim". * 
He is a tourist guide 









' l P (B/ A) , P(C/A) 
Story 3 
"David is 22 today. In 
his childhood, he used to 
run out of school and go 
walking around the 
country. He was very 
active in the Youth 
Movement, went with his 
group to the Nachal, but 
did not stay in the 
kibbutz. Today he is a 
student in the 
university." 
He is an Archeology 
student. 
He is a member of the 
society of nature 
preservation 








*An Israeli right-wing movement that believes the West Bank is an integral part of 
the State of Israel. Most of its members are religious Jews who actively participate 
in establishing jewish settlements on the West Bank. 
Table 8 
Median Chances Estimates 
Story 1 Story 2 Story 3 
(A) 55 65 so 
(B) 70 50 50 
(AflB) 70 70 80 
(A/B) 80 80 70 
(B/A) 90 60 73 
(A) 55 65 50 
(C) 30 5 30 
{AflC} 40 45 50 
(A/C) 50 70 40 
(C/A) 10 25 30 
* All medians are based on 24 .S N .S 28 
Table 9 
Significance Tests for the Differences Between Medians 
Story 1 Story 2 Story 3 
n* x2 • n x2 • n x2 • 
(A1lB) > (A) 52 (49) 0.02 53 (34) 0.19 51 (50) 13.54 0.001 
> (B) 53 (43) 0 52 (45) 4.91 0.025 50 (50) 3.92 0.025 
> (AflC) 54 (41) 10.6 0.005 54 (50) 6.45 0.01 54 (52) 7.7 0.005 
(AflC) < (A) 50 (35) 6.41 0.01 51 (43) 4.14 0.025 53 (35) 0.03 
> (C) 51 (43) 0.21 50 (46) 3.18 52 (38) 5.74 0.01 
* Number of subjects in the two compared groups. Number in parentheses is number of 
subjects in x2 test. 
Table 10 
Significance Tests for the Differences between Medians 
Story 1 Story 2 Story 3 
n* x2 oc n x2 oc n x2 • 
(A/B) > (A) 51 (36) 5.30 0.025 51 (36) 5.94 0.01 51 (50) 5.12 0.025 
• (B/A) 54 (54) 0 53 (49) 1.02 53 (43) 0.64 
(B/A) > (B) 52 (44) 7.29 0.005 50 (50) 0. 72 51 (47) 6.44 0.01 
(C/A) • (C) 52 (46) 6.97 0.01 50 (45) 1. 97 51 (48) 0 
< (A/C) 53 (48) 18.88 0.001 53 (45) 19.08 0.001 54 (51) 0.02 
(A/C) • (A) 50 (36) 1.15 52 (43) 0.17 52 (42) 0.72 
* Number of subiects in the two compared groups. Number in parentheses is number of 








EXPERIMENT 6: The Distribution of Ranks Across Probabilities 
Question 1 










1 2 3 
Each Question Separately 
15 ,@ 6 12 @ 10 
@ 9 11 @ 8 11 
5 12 @ 7 14 @ 
Question 4 Question 5 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
@ 9 14 15 @ 6 
19 @ 2 @ 11 11 
4 12 @ 7 10 !z6' "'-" 
(B/A)>(A)>(BOA) (B/A)>(A)>(BnA) (B/A)>(A)>(BnA) (A)>(B/A)>(BOA) (B/A)>(A)>(BOA) 
@ 11 13 14 @ 12 12 @ 14 14 @ 11 12 @ 15 
5 14 @ 8 3 @ 6 14 @ 7 12 @ 6 14 @ 
19 ~ 6 @ 13 9 @ 12 6 @ 13 8 ® 13 5 















73 @ 65 
32 57 @ 
@ 71 34 
(MB)> (B)> (A/B) 
* 1 = the highest probability, 3 = the lowest probability. 
